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FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING REFORM
Peter W. Rodino, Jr. *
INTRODUCTION
In the past eleven years, repeated efforts have been made in Con-
gress to bring about comprehensive reform of the federal criminal
code.' These attempts have been uniformly unsuccessful, however, be-
cause of the unbridgeable gap between deeply held political and philo-
sophical convictions.2 As a result, a consensus has formed both in
Congress and in the Reagan Administration that, in the interests of
addressing the most pressing problems of the criminal code, wide-rang-
ing revision would best be left for another day.3 However, the most
urgent of these problems, the criminal sentencing system, demands im-
mediate legislative attention.
Sentencing is the cornerstone of any criminal justice system. If
there is to be respect for the law, sentencing must be perceived as fair:
fair for victims, for defendants, and for the community. Instead of
nurturing respect, the current system breeds disrespect and confusion.'
In order to reform the system, to make it more equitable and better
understood, the Sentencing Act of 1983 was introduced.' Passage of
this legislation is the most important step that Congress can take in the
criminal justice arena.
That the Sentencing Act does not encompass comprehensive reform
does not imply that efforts at broader reform should be forever aban-
doned. The need for comprehensive redrafting continues unabated. In
fact, reference to the federal criminal "code" 6 is something of a misno-
mer. This compilation of laws is not a uniformly drafted, well-organ-
ized code. Rather, it is an amalgam of laws formed on an ad hoc
basis.7 This has resulted in a complexity, confusion, and conflict of
laws and procedure that "have aggravated problems associated with
• Member, United States House of Representatives (D-N.J.); Dana College, 1934; J.D.,
Rutgers University School of Law (Newark), 1937.
1. See H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
2. See Department of Justice Authorization. Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983) (testimony of Attorney General William French Smith).
3. Id
4. See generally Riley, Criminal Code Reform Picks Up Steam, The National Law Journal, Dec.
12, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
5. On the last day of the 1983 session, Representative Rodino introduced a bill in the House to
reform federal criminal sentencing practices. H.R. 4554, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. 10581 (1983).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-5037 (1982).
7. One writer has commented that the thrust of the reform effort is to "organize the [federal
criminal] code, codify the case law [the present code] had spawned, use consistent language
to define the mental states and other elements of various crimes, and rectify an often irra-
tional hierarchy of penalties." Riley, supra note 4, at 14, col. 2.
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rendering justice to the individual as well as to society."8
BACKGROUND
The most recent effort to recodify federal criminal laws began with
President Lyndon Johnson's message to Congress on March 9, 1966,
calling for a "National Strategy Against Crime."9 President Johnson
proposed that a commission be appointed to review federal criminal
laws and recommend revisions.' ° This commission, which came to be
known as the Brown Commission," issued its final report' 2 in January
of 1971, as a proposed new Title 18 of the United States Code. This
report has formed the foundation for all recent proposals for omnibus
reform of federal criminal laws. 3
Legislative Efforts at Reform
Efforts to pass effective reform legislation began in the 93rd Con-
gress in 1973.14 However, none of the bills introduced in that Congress
were reported out of subcommittee.'" In the 94th Congress, a revised
codification was introduced in the Senate,' 6 but stiff opposition pre-
cluded the Senate Judiciary Committee from acting on the measure.' 7
With the help of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell in 1977, Senator
John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), the late chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures,' 8 and
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), drafted a compromise bill. 9
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill favorably, 2° and the
8. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 3.
9. 112 CONG. REC. 5368 (1966).
10. Id at 5368, 5396. Legislation to establish such a commission was introduced in both the
House (H.R. 13548, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 5776 (1966)) and the Senate (S.
3064, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 5402 (1966)).
11. The Commission was chaired by the Honorable Edmund G. Brown, Sr., Governor of Cali-
fornia. It had 12 members: 3 judges, 3 senators, 3 House members and 3 persons appointed
by the President. Act of November 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516.
12. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT (1971)].
13. Riley, supra note 4, at 14, col. 4. The final report of the Brown Commission resulted in the
introduction of several bills on federal criminal law reform. Among the bills introduced
were a bill by Sen. John McClellan, D-Ark. (S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 92
(1973)), two bills by the Nixon Administration (S. 1400, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
9882 (1974) and H.R. 6046, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 10413 (1974)) and a bill
modeled after the Brown Commission's final report (H.R. 10047, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119
CONG. REC. 28464 (1973)).
14. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR, S. Doc. No. 554, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 83, 6046 (1973).
15. See generally id
16. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 211 (1975).
17. Some feel that S. I failed because it "contained a number of provisions that were anathema
to civil liberties advocates." Riley, supra note 4, at 14, col. 2.
18. Senator John L. McClellan, D-Ark., had been a member of the Brown Commission and was
in the forefront of revision attempts.
19. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 13059 (1977). The McClellan-Kennedy bill
was introduced on May 2, 1977. The text of the bill is reprinted at 124 CONG. REC. 9 (1978).
20. S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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Senate passed the bill on January 30, 1978, by a vote of 72-15.2I
Meanwhile, the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on
Criminal Justice had been conducting public hearings 22 and markup
sessions on the McClellan-Kennedy bill23 and on another bill intro-
duced by Representative William S. Cohen (R-Me.).24 The House sub-
committee reported several shortcomings in these proposals. 25  It
doubted whether "omnibus" revision was desirable26 and proposed to
cure the most glaring defects through pieces of separate legislation, im-
plementing a so-called "incremental" approach. 7 In addition, this
subcommittee began reviewing proposals for sentencing reform.28 The
session ended, however, before any of the proposals received consider-
ation by the full House Judiciary Committee.
In the first session of the 96th Congress, Senator Kennedy intro-
duced a new version of the Senate bill of the previous Congress.2 9 The
Senate Judiciary Committee again reported the bill favorably.3 °
Under new leadership in the 96th Congress, the House Subcommit-
tee on Criminal Justice reconsidered its position and decided against
piecemeal changes. Among other concerns, the members feared an
overlap between new provisions and unchanged sections of the code.3 '
However, the subcommittee also found previous omnibus efforts unac-
ceptable.3 2 Therefore, it took a middle path,33 recommending that re-
form be limited to areas where the need was greatest. Those specific
areas were identified as substantive criminal law and sentencing.34
With regard to highly controversial issues, such as capital punishment,
espionage, and bail, the subcommittee chose to simply recodify current
law.
3 5
In August, 1979, the House subcommittee introduced a draft code
after fifty meetings.3 6 Following ten days of hearings 37 and sixty-nine
21. 124 CONG. REC. 1345-465 (1978).
22. See Legislation to Revise and Recodif Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on HR. 6869 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on HR. 6869].
23. S. 1437, supra note 19. This bill passed the Senate by a vote of 72-15 on January 30, 1978,
124 CONG. REC. 1354, 1463 (1978).
24. H.R. 2311, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 1923 (1977).
25. SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON
THE RECODIFICATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print
1978).
26. Id at 3.
27. Id at 4.
28. Id at 45-47.
29. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 23,537 (1979).
30. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).





36. The draft was introduced in the Senate as S. 1723, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
23,537 (1979).
37. Hearings on the Revision of Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
[Vol. 11:218
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additional meetings spent revising the draft bill, the bill was passed on
to committee on January 7, 1980. 8 The Judiciary Committee reported
the legislation to the full House on July 2, 1980."9
For the first time in this seven-year effort to revise the federal crimi-
nal code, the Judiciary Committee of each House had reported out a
bill." The revision did not become law in the 96th Congress, however.
The House leadership was hesitant to schedule the legislation for floor
consideration and risk a bitter fight on the matter unless the Senate
acted first. A timing problem arose, however, because Senator Ken-
nedy was campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination and
was not inclined to attempt to schedule floor action. Once the nomi-
nation was decided, Senator Kennedy did seek to bring the legislation
to the floor, but threats of filibuster by opponents, notably Senators
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and James A. McClure (R-Idaho), consigned the
proposed reforms to the legislative graveyard.42
Reform bills were considered again in subcommittee during the
97th Congress,4 3 but preemptive political maneuvering prevented their
consideration by the full Judiciary Committee." By this time the polit-
ical and philosophical divergences had become so pronounced that lit-
tle hope remained of reaching accommodation among the competing
views on controversial issues.45
A few examples, taken from the histories of the bills reported out by
the Judiciary Committee in the 96th Congress, will illustrate the magni-
tude of the problem.
Concern Over Jurisdiction
One of the most significant differences between the House and Sen-
ate involved their respective views on the proper scope of federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction.' The Brown Commission47 recommended that
federal criminal jurisdiction be expanded so that federal courts could
exercise ancillary jurisdiction over criminal conduct that occurred dur-
ing the commission of a federal crime.4 8 Without this expansion, fed-
nal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Revision Hearings].
38. H.R. 6233, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 286 (1980).
39. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 6459 (1980).
40. S. REP. No. 553, supra note 30; H.R. 6915, supra note 39.
41. Riley, supra note 4, at 14, col. 3.
42. Drinan, The Federal Criminal Code. The Houses are Divided, 18 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 509, 514
(1981).
43. The Senate Judiciary Committee even managed to report a recodification bill. S. 1630, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 522 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1982).
44. The bill was strongly opposed by conservatives on the Senate floor. Riley, supra note 4, at 1,
col. 4.
45. The initial liberal-conservative compromise had by this time eroded away. Id
46. Drinan, supra note 42, at 514.
47. See discussion supra note 11.
48. See H.R. REp. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 15; S. REP. No. 553, supra note 30, at 35.
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eral courts would often lack a basis for jurisdiction over these crimes.49
For example, current law allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction
over the robbery of a local business if the robbery affects interstate or
foreign commerce." However, no federal jurisdiction exists over any
murder that might occur during the robbery. Rather, federal law in-
creases the penalty for robbery to life imprisonment.5' Ancillary juris-
diction would allow federal prosecution of the murder itself.52
Supporters of ancillary jurisdiction argued that it would increase
efficiency by allowing the consolidation of trials and plea bargaining.53
In addition, they argued that it would avoid "the alleged unfairness of
several current provisions that increase penalties for persons who cause
injury or death during the course of a federal offense, without specify-
ing any requisite state of mind for the enhanced penalties. ' '5 4  Per-
suaded by these arguments, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted a
modification of the Brown Commission's recommendation for ancillary
jurisdiction.55
Not convinced by the ancillary jurisdiction arguments of the Brown
Commission, opponents viewed the proposal as one that would expand
federal authority to the detriment of state jurisdiction,56 create some
three hundred new federal crimes,5 7 and aggravate the problem of in-
consistent verdicts. 8 The latter conclusion was based on the fact that
some states prohibit subsequent state prosecutions after a federal prose-
cution.59 In those states, a serious offender acquitted in federal court
would go unpunished for state crimes. The House Judiciary Commit-
tee heard no evidence to convince the members that state courts could
not handle both a robbery and a murder committed during the rob-
bery,' ° and concluded that the problem of inconsistent verdicts com-
pelled rejection of ancillary jurisdiction proposals.61 In addition, the
House Committee feared that state authorities would have no incentive
to prosecute if the Federal Government were to proceed first.62
Rather than expand federal jurisdiction, the House bill 63 retained
the provisions of current federal law that increase penalties when cer-
tain results occur, such as death or bodily injury.' However, the bill
49. FINAL REPORT (1971), Supra note 12, § 201(b). For a more extensive discussion of the fed-
eral jurisdiction issue, see Drinan, supra note 42, at 514-16.
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1982).
52. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 15; S. REP. No. 553, supra note 30, at 35.
53. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 17.
54. Id
55. S. 1722, supra note 29, § 201.
56. NATIONAL AssOcIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, FINAL REPORT 2, 3 (1980).
57. S. REP. No. 553, supra note 30, at 35.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 18.
59. Id at 17.
60. Id at 19.
61. Id
62. Id at 17.
63. H.R. 6915, supra note 39.
64. Drinan, supra note 42, at 516. See also H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 19.
[Vol. 11:218
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did require proof that the defendant possessed a particular state of
mind before the increased penalty would apply.65
In this case, deficiencies in the current law were widely recog-
nized. 66 Yet both judiciary committees, whose members were much
more attuned to each other than they are today, differed sharply on
how to resolve the problem.67 This speaks volumes of the difficulty of
omnibus reform.
Difficulty Over Definitions
Differing approaches to the definitions of certain offenses further
exemplify this difficulty. Four offenses in the Senate bill, 68 which
would be included in a chapter of Title 18 called "Offenses Involving
Government Processes," were extremely controversial: "Obstructing a
Government Function by Fraud";69 "Obstructing a Government Func-
tion by Physical Interference";7  "Tampering with a Victim, Witness or
Informant";7 t and "False Statements. '"72
The House Judiciary Committee found the proposed definitions of
the offenses to be so ambiguous or so broad as to stretch the limits of
due process, and possibly to render criminal a range of harmless con-
duct.73 The House bill, therefore, included narrower, specific offenses
65. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 19. See also Rothstein, Special Report-Federal Criminal
Code Revision.- Problems with Culpability Provisions, 15 CRIM. L. BULL. 157 (1979).
66. Drinan, supra note 42, at 518.
67. See generally id.
68. S. 1722, supra note 29.
69. S. 1722 proposed a new § 1301 for title 18 of the United States Code which would make it
unlawful to intentionally obstruct or impair "a government function through misrepresenta-
tion, chicanery, trickery, deceit, craft, overreaching, or other dishonest means." S. 1722,
supra note 29, § 1301.
70. Proposed section 1302 of title 18 prohibited "obstruc[tion] or impair[ment]", "by means of
physical obstacle or interference" with governmental functions involving the official duties of
a public servant. As reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the section limited the
protected functions to those of public "officials" (a defined term), judges, jurors, law enforce-
ment and correction personnel. S. 1722, supra note 29, § 1302.
71. Proposed section 1323 of title 18 included a residual clause prohibiting "any other act with
intent to influence improperly, or to obstruct or impair, the - (A) administration of justice
.... S. 1722, supra note 29, § 1323.
72. Proposed section 1343 of title 18 of the U.S. Code prohibited, inter alia, material oral false
statements to "a person assigned noncriminal investigative responsibility by statute, or by a
regulation, rule, or order issued pursuant thereto, or by head of a government agency .
S. 1722, supra note 29, § 1343.
73. The committee noted, for example, that the terms used in proposed section 1301 were those
used by the Supreme Court in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (Conspiracy to Defraud
the Government). The Committee felt that, while this broad definition-which had repeat-
edly applied to the new areas of conduct-might have been justified in the infancy of federal
criminal law, in the modem code-with specific offenses to cover conduct-it only served as
an additional weapon for the prosecution, providing bargaining leverage and frequently al-
lowing avoidance of the burdens of proving the elements of the more specific offenses. See
H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 133-37, 141-42. Proposed section 1302 had been criti-
cized as interfering with legitimate public demonstrations. Although the Committee did not
reach a specific conclusion about the validity of that criticism, it did determine that a provi-
sion covering all physical interferences, assaultive and non-assaultive, could reach trivial
conduct that simply should not be denominated criminal. Id at 138. The term "improp-
erly", used in the omnibus clause of proposed section 1323, was considered extremely vague:
what was improper would depend too heavily on the perspective of the person or persons
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 11:218
designed to prohibit the undesirable conduct without overreaching.74
The major concern was to avoid interfering with state criminal jurisdic-
tion or chilling the exercise of constitutional rights." Nevertheless, the
House provisions were criticized as undermining effective law
enforcement.76
Obstacles to Reform
Interest groups have always affected the course of federal criminal
code reform in Congress.7 7 In particular, civil liberties groups objected
to changes in the criminal law which they believed to be repressive.78
In an effort to meet these criticisms the code was redrafted, 79 but in a
way that drew fire from conservatives who found some changes too
permissive. The same conservatives wanted changes of their own lik-
ing in the highly controversial areas that were to be recodified ° In
short, the greater the number of issues disputed, the less likely was the
prospect of compromise necessary to achieve passage of the
legislation."'
An additional factor that influences legislative change is time. Un-
like the Senate, the House is not a continuing body; all its members are
elected every two years;82 its committee and subcommittee chairs
change more often than in the Senate. New chairpersons bring with
them new perspectives. In the final analysis, two years is simply not
judging the conduct. Guilty defendants' efforts to exculpate themselves could even be within
the ambit of the section. Even if convictions under such circumstances were unlikely, the
potential for harassment would be excessive. Drinan, supra note 42, at 522. Criminalization
of unsworn, oral statements, as in proposed section 1343, could too often result in a my word-
against-yours situation between a defendant and a law enforcement officer. The officer
would most likely be presumed credible by the jury; fabricated charges would be too easily
established. Id at 524.
74. For example, under proposed section 1701 of title 1 physical interferences were only prohib-
ited to the extent that they are prohibited under current law. H.R. 6915, supra note 39. See
H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 137-39. "Fraud" was given a clear definition, and
included oral false statements. Such fraud, however, was only prohibited when it produced a
particular result, which could be measured objectively by a trier of fact. See H.R. REP. No.
1396, supra note 1, at 14, 141-43. The government's protection against fraud that could not
be anticipated was continued by an inclusion of "Conspiracy to interfere with a Government
function by fraud;" under proposed section 1705. See H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 1, at
141-43.
75. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note I, at 154-59, 163, 297.
76. See, e.g., Revision Hearings, supra note 37.
77. Drinan, supra note 43, at 521-23.
78. Members of the American Civil Liberties Union testified before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee that "[u]nder the unfettered terms of S. 1722, it would be up to the prosecutor to
determine whether a large demonstration on federal grounds. . . was or was not obstructing
a government function." See Revision Hearings, supra note 37, at 10176-77 (statement of
John Shattuck & David Landau). The A.C.L.U. also thought the proposed statute was over-
broad and vague, and that: "every mass demonstration would, at one moment or another,
fall within its prohibitions." Id See also Drinan, supra note 42, at 521.
79. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 1396, supra note 1, at 138.
80. Drinan, supra note 42, at 521.
81. See generally id
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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long enough to develop, refine, and enact complicated and controver-
sial legislation such as a new criminal code.
In the end, criminal code reform failed in the 96th Congress, the
victim of political and philosophical differences and time constraints.
Nonetheless, efforts to bring about less than comprehensive reform
should not be abandoned. To say that we cannot do everything is not
to say that we can do nothing.
THE NEED FOR SENTENCING REFORM
The federal criminal sentencing process demands congressional at-
tention. Current practices result in a wide disparity among sentences
imposed on defendants convicted of similar crimes. 83 A system that
does not provide equal treatment can only foster contempt among
those who believe they have been treated unfairly. Respect for the law
cannot flourish among convicted defendants or the public when justice
is undercut by unequal treatment.
Undoubtedly, the primary responsibility for equitable administra-
tion of the criminal justice system rests with the states. In fact, many
states have begun to search for fair and practical alternatives to the
long-established practice of indeterminate sentencing. 84 Most often,
however, the states have looked to the Federal Government as a model
for their agencies, institutions, and laws. This reliance on the Govern-
ment for innovative proposals tacitly recognizes that the Federal Gov-
ernment can afford to experiment with alternatives that may benefit the
criminal justice systems of all fifty states. In the area of criminal sen-
tencing, the repeated failure of Congress to pass omnibus reform legis-
lation has left the states without direction.
In the absence of clear guidelines derived from federally sponsored
empirical studies, many states have implemented various combinations
of remedies, including mandatory minimum sentences, fixed-time (de-
terminate) sentences, sentencing guidelines, and the abolition of pa-
role.8" While each of these alternatives has its strengths, 86 each also has
the potential to exacerbate two serious problems: prison overcrowd-
83. See SENTENCE DECISION MAKING: THE LOGIC OF SENTENCE DECISIONS AND THE EXTENT
AND SOURCES OF SENTENCE DISPARITY (J. Barolomeo, K. Clancy, D. Richardson & P. Ber-
ger eds. 1981). See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE U.S., REDUCING FEDERAL JUDICIAL SENTENCING AND PROSECUTING DISPARITIES: A
SYSTEMWIDE APPROACH NEEDED (1979); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE SECOND CIR-
CUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974) (pre-
pared by A. Partridge & W. Eldridge). See also J. PETERSILLA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1983).
84. See generally RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (A. Blumstein, J.
Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE SEARCH FOR REFORM].
85. Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 72
(1983). The Administration's current sentencing bill, S. 1762, includes guidelines promul-






ng and the elimination of judicial discretion.88
In the past decade, our nation has experienced a phenomenal rise in
its prison population.89 This increase has been due not merely to a
higher crime rate9" but also to increased incarceration rates and longer
prison sentences. 9 The upshot is that our nation's prisons and jails are
seriously overcrowded.92
Furthermore, any new sentencing alternative that curtails the dis-
cretion of judges to determine who is to be incarcerated, and for how
long, deprives the criminal justice system of a means to control prison
population. The only way to prevent overcrowding without such con-
trol is to build new prisons; yet voters and their elected representatives
are notoriously reluctant to appropriate money for prison
construction.93
Whether eliminating judicial discretion in sentencing will reduce
unwarranted disparity is questionable. Discretion appears to be an en-
during component of any sentencing policy.94 Allocating sentences
purely on the basis of the offense and the offender's prior record does
not eliminate discretion, it merely shifts the discretion to an earlier
stage. Police officers and prosecuting attorneys may determine the sen-
tence by their decision of what charges to bring against a defendant. 95
It is doubtful that a prosecutor, who is an advocate for one side in the
criminal justice system, will be better able to determine who should be
imprisoned than is the judge.
Moreover, shackling discretion through overly narrow definitions of
offense and offender categories may introduce new forms of unwar-
ranted disparity. The need to establish a finite, workable number of
categories means that some important distinctions among offenses and/
or offenders will be ignored. Do we really believe, for example, that an
elderly man who owns a gun for self-protection and shoots a young
87. See generally THE SEARCH FOR REFORM, supra note 84. See also FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM (1979) (pre-
pared by S. Schulhofer) [hereinafter cited as PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION]; Alschuler, Sen-
tencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power." A Critique of Recent Proposals for "'Fixed" and
"Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978).
88. Id.
89. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 530
(1982).
90. The high crime rate of recent years may be due to numerous inseparable factors such as the
increase in the population of crime-prone age, greater reporting of crime, and stricter law
enforcement. See generally Chaiken & Chaiken, Crime Rates and the Active Criminal, in
CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 11 (J. Wilson ed. 1983).
91. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 89.
92. See Serrill, A Growing Crisis Behind Bars, TIME, Dec. 5, 1983, at 64.
93. In 1981, New York voters rejected a bond issue for prison construction. In 1980, Michigan
voters turned down a tax increase for such construction. Estimates of the cost of new prison
facilities run from $7,500 to more than $50,000 per bed. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS, CONDITION AND COST OF CON-
FINEMENT 119 (1980).




burglar in circumstances not amounting to self-defense should be im-
prisoned under a "use-a-gun, go-to-jail" law?
THE SENTENCING ACT OF 1983
The Sentencing Act of 1983, H.R. 4554, was introduced in the cur-
rent Congress to address the problems in the present system.96 Its pur-
poses are to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparity;97 to improve the
quality of information available to the sentencing judge;98 to ensure
that prison space is used efficiently;99 to incapacitate dangerous offend-
ers; 1o to encourage the development of effective alternatives to prison
for nonviolent criminals; 01 and to provide more severe nonprison
forms of punishment for white-collar and corporate criminals.10 2 H.R.
4554 provides for discretionary sentencing guidelines and modifies the
role of administrative boards in determining prisoner release."13
In addition to these rather pragmatic concerns, H.R. 4554 attempts
to respond to a very fundamental cause of sentence disparity under
current federal law. American jurisprudence provides judges with little
coherent guidance as to the objectives that the criminal justice system is
designed to achieve through sentencing criminals to specified terms of
imprisonment. I0I As a result, in many instances disparity in sentencing
will not be explained by assessing the severity of the crime nor by re-
viewing the defendant's criminal history. 05
Rationale For Incarceration
The purpose of criminal sanctions has been a focus of debate
throughout history.'0 6 Rehabilitation, the ostensible rationale for im-
prisonment through most of this century, has fallen into disfavor 0 7 and
with it the practice of indeterminate sentencing and parole. 08 The be-
lief that we can "cure" criminals through correctional treatment has
been abandoned."° Current scholars stress incapacitation, retribution,
and punishment. !"0 Notions of retribution and punishment are partic-
ularly popular because of the public demand that authorities "get
96. H.R. 4554, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H10581 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983).
97. Id § 4 (proposed new ch. 239, § 3521(2) of title 18 U.S.C. ).
98. Id § 2 (proposed new ch. 225, §§ 3524, 3525 of title 18 U.S.C.).
99. See id §§ 4, 5 (proposed new chs. 239, 311, §§ 3791(d), 4201(f)(1) of title 18 U.S.C.).
100. Id § 2 (proposed new chs. 225, 231, § 3521(3)(C) of title 18 U.S.C.).
101. See id (proposed new chs. 225, 231, §§ 3523(b), 3583(b) of title 18 U.S.C.).
102. Id (proposed new chs. 229, 231 of title 18 U.S.C.).
103. Id § 5 (proposed new ch. 311 of title 18 U.S.C.).
104. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REDUCING FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SENTENCING AND PROSECUTING DISPARITIES: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
NEEDED 17, 18 (1979).
105. See id at 5.
106. See A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE 13 (1979).
107. See id
108. See R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 1-8 (1979).
109. See id at 7.
110. See, e.g., Greenwood, Controlling the Crime Rate Through Imprisonment, in CRIME AND




Gradually, we are learning that criminal sanctions can and should
serve a variety of purposes.' 12 No single objective is sufficient to sup-
port an all-encompassing framework on which all sentencing decisions
may rest. Thus, even as we recognize that individuals must receive
their "just deserts" and that society has a right to extract a legitimate
vengeance for wrongful acts, no person can determine the precise de-
gree of moral culpability to be attached to a particular crime, nor how
to translate that culpability into a specific sentence. 13 Moreover, few
would carry retribution to its logical extreme. Thus, few would con-
sider it worthwhile to imprison a robber who is permanently paralyzed
from the neck down, except perhaps for deterrent purposes. Even the
pervasive concept of just deserts can serve only as a guide to fixing the
relative severity of sentences of various crimes. 1
14
Nor can the principles of incapacitation or deterrence provide an
overriding framework for sentencing decisions. Common sense sug-
gests that punishment deters; yet we have no reliable means to deter-
mine the differential deterrent value of various sentences.' '
Furthermore, no one would propose the death penalty for petty theft,
even if we were convinced that capital punishment would drastically
reduce the incidence of the crime. Likewise, individuals assuredly
would be prevented from pursuing criminal careers if every crime car-
ried a life sentence. Equitable principles underlying our criminal jus-
tice system, however, including those on which the eighth
amendment" 16 rests, preclude such a policy.
Rehabilitation raises different questions. Clearly, some prisoners
can be rehabilitated; others can not. 1 7 Unfortunately, we have no
means of distinguishing between those who will benefit from prison
and those who will not."1 8 Thus, serious doubts have been raised about
whether a sentence as severe as imprisonment should ever be justified
by a desire for rehabilitation. Rehabilitation may, however, be an im-
portant criterion in assessing the value of alternative sentences.
The Sentencing Act of 1983 (H.R. 4554) would provide the judici-
Crime Control, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 87 (1983); Wilson, Dealing with the High-Rate
Offender, 72 PUB. INTEREST 52 (1983); VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
111. See Serrill, supra note 92, at 64.
112. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 185 (1978).
113. See, e.g., MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 179-209 (1982); Monahan, The Case
for Prediction in the Modified Desert Model of Criminal Sentencing, 5 INT'L J. OF L. & PSY-
CHOLOGY 103 (1982).
114. Id.
115. See generally NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., PANEL ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS,
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
ON CRIME RATES (Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin eds. 1978).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
117. See generally THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
(L. Sechrist, S. White & E. Brown eds. 1979); NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF




ary with a list of factors to be considered in imposing criminal
sentences."19 First, H.R. 4554 instructs the sentencing judge to consider
each of the traditional purposes of sentencing: deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation. 20  Other provisions then direct the court to
consider ordering restitution to the victims of crimes, ' 2' and to evaluate
the likelihood of reconciliation of the offender with his family and his
community as functions of sentencing. 2 2 This legislation is the first
that would make clear to federal judges that these goals are to be satis-
fied only within the limits imposed by the necessity of ensuring that
defendants are justly punished, and that sentences are uniformly im-
posed, commensurate with the culpability of the offender and the harm
done. 123
Sentencing Provisions
As effective alternatives to imprisonment, the legislation establishes
new sentences for white-collar and corporate criminals 124 and substan-
tially increases the maximum fines for all offenses.125 For organiza-
tions, fines of up to $1,000,000 may be assessed for felonies or
misdemeanors causing loss of life,' 26 while limits of $50,000 to $250,000
may be imposed for other offenses.' 27 The maximum penalty under
current federal law varies, but only infrequently does it approach these
levels. 128 Furthermore, if the monetary loss to the victim or the gain to
the defendant is measurable, the defendant may be fined alternatively
up to twice such loss or gain.'2 9 This provision is designed both to
deprive criminals of their ill-gotten gain and to deter future
wrongdoers.
In addition to establishing new penalty schedules, the bill prescribes
equitable remedies to apply to corporate crime. Among these, H.R.
4554 sets forth procedures for probation '30 and orders of restitution.' 3'
It authorizes the appointment of a special master to supervise the com-
pliance of an organization with conditions of probation. 32 Individual
119. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 2 (proposed new ch. 225, § 3522 of title 18 U.S.C.).
120. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3521(3) of title 18 U.S.C.).
121. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3521(3)(e) of title 18 U.S.C.).
122. Id § 2. Section two of H.R. 4554 would amend title 18 U.S.C. by deleting current chapter
225 (verdict), chapter 227 (sentencing, judgment, and execution), chapter 229 (fines, penalties
and forfeitures), and chapter 231 (probation), and enacting new chapters governing the im-
position of sentence following conviction of a crime. Instructions to the court on the pur-
poses of sentencing are in proposed new section 3521 of title 18.
123. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 2 (proposed new ch. 225, § 3521 of title 18 U.S.C.).
124. Id. (proposed new ch. 229, § 3561 of title 18 U.S.C.).
125. Id
126. Id (proposed new ch. 229, § 3561(a)(2) of title 18 U.S.C.).
127. Id.
128. For example, current law provides for a $20,000 maximum fine for transportation of explo-
sives with the knowledge that they will be used to kill or injure, when it results in personalinjury. 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (1982).
129. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 2 (proposed new ch. 229, § 3561(3) of title 18 U.S.C.).
130. Id § 2 (proposed new ch. 231 of title 18 U.S.C.).
131. Id § 2 (proposed new ch. 231, §§ 3601-3605 of title 18 U.S.C.).
132. Id (proposed new ch. 231, § 3583(a)(3) of title 18 U.S.C.).
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offenders can also be disqualified from holding corporate office during
the probation period.133 A court can also require a defendant to notify
any victims that there has been a criminal conviction. ' 34 The aim here
is to facilitate restoring victims to their position prior to the offense.
It must be remembered that H.R. 4554 is designed to provide an
equitable balance between the interests of the victim and the rights of
the defendant. In addressing post-conviction sentencing procedure,
this legislation requires the probation service to prepare for the court a
presentence report.' 35 The report must be disclosed to the defendant
36
and a separate hearing must be held before sentencing to allow the




The legislation instructs the court to prescribe a sentence that com-
ports with sentencing guidelines, unless aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances warrant departure from the guidelines. I3 Before imposing
a sentence, the court must evaluate sentencing options, which are enu-
merated in order of increasing severity.' 39 The court must impose the
least severe sanction necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing. 140
The court must resolve any factual disputes and state on the record
why a particular sentence was imposed and why it is the least severe
alternative. 141
The success of H.R. 4554 in achieving effective sentencing reform
rests with the promulgation of sentencing guidelines. Therefore, H.R.
4554 establishes procedures for promulgating these guidelines.142 Once
in place, the guidelines will reduce sentence disparity by giving the
courts sentencing standards which do not exist today.' 43  They will
help the courts and Congress to relate levels of punishment to clear-cut
categories of offenders and offenses. The development of the guide-
lines would necessarily provide a forum for creating national sentenc-
ing policies.
133. Id (proposed new ch. 231, § 3583(c)(1) of title 18 U.S.C.).
134. Id (proposed new ch. 231, § 3621 of title 18 U.S.C.).
135. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3524(a) of title 18 U.S.C.).
136. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3524(b) of title 18 U.S.C.).
137. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3525 of title 18 U.S.C.).
138. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3522 of title 18 U.S.C.).
139. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3523(a) of title 18 U.S.C.).
140. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3523(b)(2) of title 18 U.S.C.).
141. Id (proposed new ch. 225, § 3523(b) of title 18 U.S.C.).
142. Id § 4.
143. Feinberg, Sentencing Reform and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 5 HAMLINE L. REV.
217, 222-23 (1982).
The indeterminate sentence first permits the sentencing court to sentence a convicted
offender within vast statutory limits ranging in some cases from probation to life im-






Developing specific standards will be the task of a commission of
the Judicial Conference of the United States. 44 This proposed provi-
sion contrasts with those of prior sentencing legislation which called for
guidelines to be set by a sentencing commission composed of presiden-
tial appointees.'45
The former provision is justified on the ground that a presiden-
tially-appointed panel can too easily be dominated by political inter-
ests. The temptation to seek public approval by appearing tough on
crime and therefore to propose standards biased in favor of prosecution
and incarceration might prove too great. Such a bias could readily de-
feat the effort to keep our prison population under control, and result
in forced reliance on early release programs to avoid overcrowding,
shifting the system even further from "truth in sentencing."
Use of the Judicial Conference has much to recommend it. First,
the procedures of the Judicial Conference are familiar to Congress. 146
Second, when judges take part in the formulation of sentencing guide-
lines, they will likely perceive the standards as fair, consistent, and
practical. Third, the Judicial Conference has the resources to do the
job without the necessity of creating another commission. 147 Further-
more, by reserving ultimate decision on the guidelines to Congress,
148
this plan preserves for Congress its constitutional responsibility to de-
clare what conduct is criminal and to set maximum criminal
sanctions. 149
The proposed guidelines prescribed by H.R. 4554 are based on cate-
gories of defendants and offenses. ' 50 In this way, offenders with similar
criminal histories convicted of offenses in the same category should not
receive substantially different sentences. The guidelines indicate the
range of appropriate fines or imprisonment for each category, and the
circumstances under which cumulative sentences are appropriate. 15
The maximum appropriate prison term is not to exceed four-fifths of
the maximum for the offense, except for violent career criminals.'52
The minimum limit of the guidelines range for violent career criminals
144. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 4, (proposed new ch. 239, § 379 1(a)(1) of title 18 U.S.C.).
145. See, e.g., S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S 11679, 680-706 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1983); H.R. 2151, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1265 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1983).
146. The Judicial Conference recommends amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court, which submits such propos-
als to Congress. The proposals go into effect unless disapproved by Congress. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982).
147. The Judicial Conference is uniquely able to suggest the necessary guidelines. Such a func-
tion would be similar in nature to other functions performed by the Judicial Conference. It
has, for example, many standing committees such as the rules committee and also has at its
disposal vast informational resources.
148. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 4 (proposed new ch. 239 § 3791(a)(2) of title 18 U.S.C.).
149. [d
150. Id (proposed new ch. 239, § 3792(a) of title 18 U.S.C.).
151. Id (proposed new ch. 239, § 3792(c) of title 18 U.S.C.).
152. Id (proposed new ch. 239, § 3 7 92(c)(2) of title 18 U.S.C.).
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must not be less than two-thirds the maximum imprisonment for the
offense.' 53 The guidelines will also help the court set the proper condi-
tions of probation.'54
Even the most tightly drawn sentencing guidelines could be will-
fully or unknowingly circumvented through unfettered use of
prosecutorial discretion. 55 Persons with similar criminal histories con-
victed of like offenses could receive markedly different sentences, de-
pending upon their success in plea bargaining. 5 6
United States Attorneys have diverse prosecutorial policies and no
adequate standards to guide those policies.'5 7 Since plea bargaining
severely limits the range of punishment a federal judge can impose, the
risk would remain that the application of justice would be disparate for
reasons unrelated to the guilt of the offender. To lessen the current
inequities, the Judicial Conference would develop standards to coordi-
nate sentencing and plea bargaining policies. 5 1
To ensure that the commission reflects a diversity of views, H.R.
4554 requires that, while five of the nine members are to be active fed-
eral judges, the other four cannot be judges or former judges. 15
Supervised Release
The Sentencing Act of 1983 also reevaluates the function and effec-
tiveness of parole. For most of this century, rehabilitation and judicial
discretion played a central role in sentencing. 160 The criminal was con-
sidered ill, and a period of imprisonment was to provide a cure. 16 1
Because it was impossible to predict the length of incarceration neces-
sary to effect the cure, the parole board was to assess the inmate's pro-
gress and decide when the prisoner should be released. 162 However,
parole boards, operating without policies or standards, have been un-
able to determine when a prisoner is rehabilitated. 163 The lack of cer-
tainty created by such a system has been blamed for fostering prison
unrest and disrespect for the law.' 64
Parole has also been criticized because of the realization that prison
153. Id (proposed new ch. 239, § 3792(d) of title 18 U.S.C.).
154. Id (proposed new ch. 239, § 3792(c) (3) of title 18 U.S.C.).
155. THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., REDUCING FEDERAL JUDICIAL SENTENCING
AND PROSECUTING DISPARITIES 15, 16 (1979).
156. Id
157. Id
158. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 4 (proposed new ch. 239, § 3793(a) of title 18 U.S.C.).
159. Id (proposed new ch. 239, § 3794(b)(2) of title 18 U.S.C.).
160. SINGER, supra note 108, at 1-8.
161. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 84 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE].
162. Id
163. See generally Von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Con-
victed Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1971).
164. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 161, at 121-44 (1971); Federal Criminal Law Revi-
sion: Hearings on H.R. 1647 and HR. 4711 Before The Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of The




programs have had little effect on rehabilitation. Social science litera-
ture has shown either that prison programs have little effect on whether
a prisoner will commit new crimes upon release or that it is impossible
to predict which programs work and under what circumstances. 65
In the early 1970's, the United States Parole Board, as it was known
then, developed and effected parole-release guidelines.' 66 These guide-
lines were not based on good conduct, for which no objective criteria
for evaluation existed and which could be feigned, but on the serious-
ness of a person's crime and criminal history.167 This created a fairer
parole system, but problems persisted: inmates still did not know when
they would be released and no explicit procedures existed to protect
prisoners in the parole process.1 68  In response to these deficiencies,
Congress passed the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of
1976. 169 Guidelines were statutorily mandated, ensuring procedural
fairness and certainty of presumptive release dates. 7 ° This system has
allowed the Parole Commission, as it is now known, to set realistic
prison terms 7 ' and to reduce sentence disparity. 72
Because these guidelines have been successfully utilized, critics of
parole argue that application of the guidelines should be transferred
from the end of the process to the beginning. The guidelines could
then apply to all sentencing decisions and not just sentences involving
prison terms of more thlan one year.173 Critics also see parole as being
"soft" on criminals, contending that it undercuts the symbolic function
of imprisonment. 174  Furthermore, they assert that once sentencing
guidelines are created, parole becomes duplicative: having two sets of
guidelines (sentencing and parole) would allow the Parole Commission
to overrule judicially developed guidelines. 175
Conversely, advocates of parole argue that it serves a "safety net"
165. D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREAT-
MENT 627 (1975).
166. SILBERMAN, supra note 112, at 290; R. Wool, The newparole and the case of Mr. Simms, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 25.
167. SILBERMAN, supra note 112. The parole board was concerned with three sets of factors:
[t]he seriousness of the offense (whether or not the victim was injured, and how seri-
ously, and how big a financial loss the victim suffered); the nature and seriousness of
the offender's prior record; and the way he conducted himself in prison. . . . (Since
institutional behavior played a relatively minor role in parole decisions, the guidelines
gear decisions to the first two factors).
Id
168. See Harris, Disquisition on the Needfor a New Model for Criminal Sanctioning Systems, 77
W. VA. L. REV. 263, 297 (1975). See also VON HIRSCH & HANRAHAN, supra note 106, at 4.
169. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (codified at
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
170. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205-4218 (1982).
171. See VON HIRSCH & HANRAHAN, supra note 106, at 89-90; Blumstein & Cohen, Sentencing of
Convicted Offenders.- An Analysis of the Public's View, 14 LAW & Soc'y REV. (1980).
172. Gottfredson, Parole Guidelines and the Reduction of Sentencing Disparity.- A Preliminary
Study, 16 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQ. 218 (1979); O'Leary, Parole Theory and Out-
comes Reexamined, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 304, 306-08 (1975).
173. S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 912-32 (1980).
174. Von Hirsch, supra note 163, at xvi.
175. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-56 (1983).
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function by reducing prison terms that are too long and by controlling
fluctuation of prison terms.' 76 Supporters assert that abrupt abolition
of parole would eliminate this essential equity-restoring mechanism. 1
77
The Sentencing Act of 1983 both preserves the safety net and deals
with the problems that critics of parole cite, by integrating the parole
function with sentencing guidelines. 17 The legislation keys the earliest
eligibility for supervised release, a date that must be set within 120 days
of accepting a prisoner into custody, to the expiration of eighty percent
of the minimum applicable guidelines or, for those sentenced under the
relevant guidelines, eighty percent of the prison term imposed. 79 Re-
garding the setting of this date, prisoners are guaranteed certain due
process rights such as notice of hearing, access to documents, and con-
sultation with a qualified representative. 8 0
To help courts implement the guideline system without undue dis-
ruption of court procedure and to permit experimentation during de-
velopment of the guidelines, H.R. 4554 does not limit guideline
range. 18 ' Because of this, the initial guidelines for some categories may
be very broad (for example, four to ten years) and thus reintroduce
disparity into the system. To prevent such inequity, H.R. 4554 autho-
rizes the Board of Imprisonment (the Board),i2 which would replace
the Parole Commission, to consider offense and offender characteristics
in setting the supervised release date, but only to the degree necessary
to remedy intra-guideline disparity. 8 3 Thus, the Board is not author-
ized to correct disparity resulting from an offender being sentenced
above the guideline; it cannot override a court's decision that such a
sentence is appropriate. 8 4 If the guidelines are properly narrow when
proposed or gradually become so, the role of the Board in reducing
disparity will, of necessity, become redundant.
Another potential problem is that the guidelines might set a sen-
tence range that far exceeds the average time now served for similar
offenses. This could result in prison overcrowding. To remedy this
possible effect, the legislation permits release dates to be advanced 120
days when prison population exceeds capacity. 8 5 However, this safety
valve is not applicable to violent career criminals. 8 6
The concept of "good time" would also be integrated into the re-
lease provisions of the bill, but in a manner different from current
176. See Hearings on HR. 6869, supra note 22, at 791.
177. Id
178. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 2 (proposed new ch. 227, § 3543 of title 18 U.S.C.).
179. Id § 5. This amends 18 U.S.C., ch. 311 (parole) by replacing it with a new chapter (super-
vised release) under sections 4201-4211.
180. Id (proposed new ch. 311, § 4203 of title 18 U.S.C.).
181. Id § 2 (proposed new ch. 225, § 3522 to title 18 U.S.C.).
182. Id § 5 (proposed new ch. 311, § 4210 of title 18 U.S.C.).
183. Id (proposed new ch. 311, § 4201 of title 18 U.S.C.).
184. See generally id § 2 (proposed new ch. 225, § 3521 of title 18 U.S.C.). See also id § 5 (pro-
posed new ch. 311, § 4201 of title 18 U.S.C.).




law.'8 7 The release date cannot be advanced for good behavior, but
may be retarded if the Board finds the prisoner guilty of serious mis-
conduct while imprisoned. 188 Currently, good behavior credits are de-
ducted from the maximum sentence, which is often not served.' 89
Under H.R. 4554, penalties for misconduct are to be added to the ac-
tual time served.' 9° Thus, every prisoner will have an incentive not to
misbehave.
The replacement of good time and parole with an integrated system
of Board-determined release criteria within statutory limits would
bring the system closer to achieving "truth in sentencing," and would
make it more rational and more easily understood. The system would
also permit a mandatory period of supervision for all prisoners upon
their release.' In contrast, inmates who are now incarcerated the
longest because of misbehavior in prison-those who should have the
longest possible supervision before being dismissed-actually have the
shortest period of post-release supervision.' 92 Those who behave the
best and, therefore, least need post-release supervision, are supervised
the longest.' 93 Under H.R. 4554, the severity of the crime determines
the length of supervision: three years for the most serious crimes, two
years or less for lesser offenses.' 94
CONCLUSION
The political and philosophical divisions in Congress will likely
preclude sweeping revision of the criminal code in the immediate fu-
ture, despite the desirability of a comprehensive measure. Lesser dif-
ferences have thwarted all recent efforts at omnibus revision, and the
current dichotomy counsels against an attempt at this time.
Sentencing is the cornerstone of any criminal justice system. If the
system is to meet the needs of society, sentencing must be perceived as
fair and equitable to the victims, the offender, and the community. It
must be understood and supported by the public and all elements of
the criminal justice system. The current federal sentencing process de-
mands urgent congressional attention and cannot await broader re-
form. Deficiencies in the law result in wide disparity among sentences
imposed for similar crimes. The system does not provide equal treat-
187. Id (proposed new ch. 311, § 4202(b) of title 18 U.S.C.).
188. Id
189. VON HIRSCH & HANRAHAN, supra note 106, at 2.
190. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 5 (proposed new ch. 311, § 4202 of title 18 U.S.C.).
191. Id (proposed new ch. 311, § 4201(a) of title 18 U.S.C.).
192. Such is the situation where a prisoner has served his maximum sentence (or close to the
maximum) for reasons of bad behavior in prison, leaving little or no time on supervised
parole.
193. Conversely, a prisoner who fails to serve the maximum nevertheless remains on supervised
parole for the remainder of the sentence following his release. Thus, community resources
are expended to supervise the activities of the prisoner who has been released for "good
behavior."
194. H.R. 4554, supra note 96, § 5 (proposed new ch. 311, § 4206(a) of title 18 U.S.C.).
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ment, and those who believe they have been treated unfairly-whether
victim, offender, or community-become contemptuous of it.
The Sentencing Act of 1983 addresses the imperfections of current
law. It provides clear legislative guidance to the judiciary regarding the
purposes of sentencing, the factors to be considered in imposing a sen-
tence, and the kinds of sentences available. H.R. 4554 requires imposi-
tion of the least severe sentence that will be consistent with the safety of
the public and the gravity of the crime. The legislation controls
prosecutorial discretion by coordinating plea bargaining and sentenc-
ing guidelines. It stresses incapacitation of violent and repeat offend-
ers, while providing alternatives to prison for nonviolent offenders,
such as day fines and community service. The bill provides an efficient
safety valve for prison overpopulation. The Sentencing Act of 1983
stresses restitution to victims and promotes reconciliation of the of-
fender with his family and with the community. The legislation also
provides for more severe punishment for white-collar crime.
Even though the bill structures the sentencing system to a greater
and presumably more coherent degree, it does not do so at the risk of
denying defendants their rights. It emphasizes adherence to procedural
due process through use of a detailed sentence hearing. In sum, H.R.
4554 will reduce sentence disparity, improve the quality of justice, en-
sure that expensive prison space is used efficiently to incapacitate dan-
gerous offenders, and encourage "creative sentencing" as an effective
alternative to prison for nonviolent offenders.
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